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The timely diffusion of knowledge and information seems crucial for the efficient
delivery of medical care given its complex nature and the considerable value-added
associated with new medical technologies (Cutler and McClellan, 2001). Even in a
world characterized by the electronic transmission of much information, physical
location matters for knowledge flows because electronic contacts have been found to
complement rather than substitute for face-to-face encounters (Gaspar and Glaeser,
1998).
Close physical contact may be of even more importance for knowledge flows in
the hospital services industry because many medical procedures must be visually
demonstrated. For example, Escarce (1996) shows empirically that access to infor-
mation about laparoscopic cholecystectomy influenced surgeon’s adoption behavior
and that externalities in hospitals may have hastened the diffusion of the procedure.
Perhaps reflecting the significance of medical face-to-face contact, Phelps (1992) notes
that local schools of thought develop and partly account for observed geographical
variations in medical practices. Given the importance of knowledge flows and the
continued emphasis on face-to-face encounters especially for medical care, close prox-
imity of hospitals may be essential for the efficient delivery of medical care. That is,
hospital productivity might be greater where hospitals cluster and allow knowledge
to more easily and quickly disperse among personnel in the various organizations.
In addition to the sharing of knowledge, clustering may improve productivity for
a number of other reasons. For one, competition among the hospitals in a cluster may
encourage efficiency improving innovations (Porter, 1990). The pressure to innovate,
in turn, enhances productivity. Two, joint ventures and strategic alliances can more
easily be accommodated in areas where hospitals group together. For example, a few
years ago, Day Kimball Hospital and Backus Hospital, both located in eastern Con-
necticut, agreed to share the cost of a mobile MRI unit. Through their collaborative618 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
relationship, the two hospitals kept the unit operating closer to its capacity and thereby
raised the overall productivity of the two organizations. As another example, Mease
Health Care and Morton Plant Hospital, both located in Florida’s North Pinellas
County, entered into a joint venture to collectively provide outpatient care, specific
types of tertiary care such as open-heart surgery, and certain administrative ser-
vices like accounting, housekeeping, and laundry in 1993 (Davidson, 1994). This joint
venture allowed the two hospitals to provide more hospital services with the same
amount of inputs, thereby raising overall productivity.
In general, urban economists refer to the economies gained by the clustering of
firms as agglomeration economies of which there are two kinds. Localization econo-
mies deal with any efficiencies resulting from the clustering of firms in the same
industry as a result of shared suppliers, knowledge spillovers, incentives for innova-
tion, and labor market pooling. For the same reasons, urbanization economies per-
tain to any productivity improvements when firms from different industries collect
together in the same area. A sizeable amount of empirical evidence has provided
evidence for agglomeration economies in the manufacturing and office sectors (e.g.,
Henderson, 1986; Carlino, 1979; Mun and Hutchinson, 1995).
If agglomeration economies hold in the hospital services industry, hospital pro-
ductivity should be greater in metropolitan areas with more hospitals, ceteris pari-
bus. However, some prior research in the hospital services industry has found con-
trary evidence indicating that an increased number of hospitals in the same area
causes productivity losses because the various hospitals engage in a “medical arms
race” (Robinson and Luft, 1985). Hospitals participate in a medical arms race when
they spend unnecessarily on items such as cosmetic quality improvements, cost-en-
hancing technologies, and duplicate facilities as a way of attracting more physicians
and patients (Robinson and Luft, 1985). As the hospitals compete among themselves,
like too many crabs in a barrel may tend to do, the nonprice competition results in
lower levels of productivity.
Consequently, theory alone cannot identify how the clustering of hospitals
affects productivity. Agglomeration economies suggest that clustering of firms will
improve hospital productivity whereas the medical arms race hypothesis points to
the possibility of lower productivity in hospitals. O hUallachain and Satterthwaite
(1992), the only other study on agglomeration economies in the hospital services in-
dustry, focus on employment growth in the hospital services industry across U.S.
metropolitan areas. They find that urbanization economies but not localization econo-
mies characterize the hospital services industry. Their study, however, covers the
period from 1977 to 1984. The hospital services industry has undergone a tremen-
dous structural transformation since that time with changes like the Medicare DRG
system, managed care competition, and new medical technologies exerting a domi-
nant influence. The transformation may have seriously altered the underlying struc-
ture of producing hospital services. Even if the structural changes have had no influ-
ence on production arrangements in the hospital services industry, it still remains
very difficult to generalize about the existence of agglomeration economies from only
one study.619 AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES IN THE HOSPITAL INDUSTRY
 To add to our understanding about agglomeration economies in the hospital ser-
vices sector, this study analyzes how the clustering of hospitals in the various metro-
politan areas of the U.S. affects industry wide productivity. The multiple regression
analysis is conducted on a cross-sectional basis for both 1993 and 1999 and by using
first differencing of the data between the two years. The empirical results provide
support for both static and dynamic localization economies in the hospital services
industry. The next section develops the empirical model and discusses the data. Sec-
tion III reviews the empirical findings. A summary and some conclusions are offered
in section IV.
EMPIRICAL MODEL, SAMPLE, AND DATA
Our conceptual model assumes that the typical hospital produces a single mea-
sure of output, Q, by employing and combining two general types of inputs: beds, B,
and various types of labor, L. The marginal product of each input is assumed to be
positive and to decline with respect to increased usage. It follows that a generalized
production function can be written as:
(1) Q = E {·} f (B, L),
where E{·} represents an exogenous Hicks-neutral efficiency function described be-
low. Expressing equation (1) in relative factor terms gives:
(2) Q/B = E {·} g (L/B).
The left hand side of equation (2) can be interpreted as average product per bed.
It can also be interpreted as a general indicator of average productivity because it
reflects how much output can be generated from a bed with the amount of various
inputs, like nurses and physicians per bed, held constant.
Agglomeration economies potentially influence the production of hospital ser-
vices through the efficiency function. As mentioned in the introduction, urban econo-
mists point to two types of agglomeration economies: localization and urbanization
economies. Localization and urbanization economies are introduced into equation (2)
by supposing that the efficiency function can be specified as a function of the number
of community hospitals, H, and population, POP1, in the market area, or:
(3) E {·} = e (H, POP, X).
If both types of agglomeration economies hold, the efficiency function increases
with the number of hospitals and population, ceteris paribus.
In addition to the two agglomeration variables, a vector of variables, X, is speci-
fied in the efficiency function to control for organizational and market factors poten-
tially affecting productivity. One such organizational variable is the typical size of a
hospital because theory suggests that productivity may depend upon the size or scale620 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
of the organization. In addition, prior research has suggested that health mainte-
nance organizations (HMOs) may be associated with greater hospital productivity
(Miller and Luft, 1994). Most hospitals are organized on a not-for-profit basis and the
attenuation of property rights may create an incentive for not-for-profit hospitals to
operate with some slack or X-inefficiency. By design, health maintenance organiza-
tions (HMOs) are supposed to encourage health care providers to adopt cost-effective
practices. If slack exists in production, the pressure from HMOs to adopt cost-effec-
tive practices may cause hospitals to raise average productivity. As a result, greater
dominance of HMOs in the market area might be found to be associated with greater
productivity.
Lastly, income and an indicator of teaching status are specified in the empirical
model to control for efficiency differences. Because the quality of medical care is most
likely a normal good, and more time per patient reflects higher quality, an inverse
relation is anticipated between per capita income and average productivity. That is,
employing more resources per patient within a particular time period means fewer
patients can be treated. Likewise, teaching hospitals generally operate with higher
levels of quality and treat more severely ill patients. Higher levels of quality and
more severe case-mixes require additional time per patient and thus results in lower
average productivity.
Given that this study examines how the clustering of hospitals affects productiv-
ity, defining the relevant market area in which hospitals cluster becomes an impor-
tant consideration. We assume that the metropolitan area serves as a suitable mea-
sure of the relevant geographical market (RGM). While this definition of the RGM
partly results from the ready availability of data, researchers such as Baker, Cantor,
Long, and Marquis (2000), Pauly, Hillman, Kim, and Brown (2002), and Spang, Bazzoli
and Arnould (2001) have recently used the metropolitan area for their empirical studies
on the health insurance and hospital services markets. Moreover, agglomeration econo-
mies potentially take place in urban areas, providing another important reason to
define the metropolitan area as the RGM.
The metropolitan area also serves as the unit of analysis. Because of the aggre-
gated level of the analysis, some bias may be introduced if the individual hospitals in
the metropolitan area face different underlying production structures or incentives.
For example, larger hospitals may operate with more sophisticated medical tech-
nologies than smaller ones. However, the aggregation process may help to reduce
another type of bias that results from individual hospitals reacting to anticipated
rather than actual demand. That is, the observed output rate deviates from the planned
rate due to unforeseen changes in demand. Borts (1960) refers to this dilemma as the
‘regression fallacy’. Keeler and Ying (1996) suggest using state data because the “use
of group means should dramatically reduce or eliminate the bias resulting from the
regression fallacy” (p. 473). Our use of metropolitan level data should serve a similar
purpose. Thus, by using metropolitan level data, we have chosen to trade-off one type
of econometric problem against the other.
Some measure of hospital output, Q, is necessary to conduct the empirical analy-
sis. Investigators have used a number of different indicators of hospital output in-621 AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES IN THE HOSPITAL INDUSTRY
cluding the number of discharges, admissions, or inpatient days. However, these mea-
sures fail to capture the medical care provided in the outpatient facilities of hospi-
tals. If the data available to us assigned various hospital inputs to either inpatient or
outpatient care, the neglect of outpatient care would not be too troublesome except
for any problems associated with substitutability between these two types of hospital
care; but that is not the case with our data set. As a result, we use adjusted inpatient
days as our measure of hospital output. Adjusted inpatient days equal the sum of
inpatient days and the number of equivalent outpatient visits based on the ratio of
outpatient to inpatient expenses. The services and treatments embedded in the mea-
sure of adjusted inpatient days are kept as homogeneous as possible by only includ-
ing community hospitals in the sample. Community hospitals tend to produce a simi-
lar cluster of inpatient and outpatient services.
One potential drawback of using adjusted inpatient days as a measure of hospi-
tal output concerns the lack of any adjustments for patient case-mix and quality.
Some hospitals handle more severe case-mixes and/or offer higher levels of quality
than others. Unfortunately, data on patient case-mix and quality of care are not
readily available at the metropolitan level for inpatient care and do not appear to be
available for outpatient care. However, the absence of any case-mix or quality adjust-
ment may not be cause for serious alarm because the dramatic case-mix and quality
differences that normally exist among hospitals within a given urban area may aver-
age out across hospitals in different metropolitan areas (Keeler and Ying, 1996). In
addition, a first difference of data approach is also used in the analysis so any re-
maining case-mix and quality differences may be netted out.
Data are collected from various sources for the metropolitan areas in the U.S. for
both 1993 and 1999. Four different labor inputs, total nurses, physicians and den-
tists on staff, other salaried personnel, and admitting physicians, are specified in the
multiple regression equation. All but admitting physicians are expressed in full-time
equivalent terms. Figures for the actual number of admitting physicians are unavail-
able so the total number of active, nonfederal physicians less the number of physi-
cians and dentists on staff is used as a proxy. To reduce the likelihood of collinearity
between the number of hospitals and population, the number of hospitals is specified
on a per capita basis. Statewide enrollment in HMOs as a percent of the population is
specified to capture the relative dominance of HMOs in each metropolitan area.2 In
the empirical model, the number of trainees per bed captures the prevalence of teaching
hospitals in the metropolitan area. Appendix A lists the mean, standard deviation,
minimum and maximum values, and data source of each variable used in the empiri-
cal study.
A few metropolitan areas in New England could not be used in the empirical test
because data for population and income are reported at the consolidated metropoli-
tan level and therefore are not consistent with the hospital data listed for metropoli-
tan areas. Observations for the two years differ because new metropolitan areas were
designated after 1993.622 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Substituting equation (2) into equation (3) yields the following function:
(4) Q/B = e (H, POP, X) · g (L/B),
or more simply:
(5) Q/B = m (H, POP, X, L/B).
It is assumed that all of the variables in equation (5) enter the estimation equa-
tion in log form so the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities.3 Ordi-
nary least square estimates of the parameters are obtained.4 White’s (1980) test finds
evidence of heteroskedasticity so his method is used to derive heteroskedasticity-
consistent estimates of the standard errors. The multiple regression results are pro-
vided in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 using data for 1993 and 1999, respectively. The
estimated coefficient and associated t-statistic are shown opposite each independent
variable. Each coefficient identifies how a marginal change in an independent vari-
able affects the number of adjusted inpatient days per bed in the metropolitan area,
assuming all other variables remain constant.
Recall that the purpose of this paper is to test for the existence of agglomeration
economies in the hospital services industry. Theory suggests that agglomeration econo-
mies may arise from a clustering of economic activity as a result of shared knowledge
and input suppliers and of labor market pooling. In addition, competition among the
firms in the same industry cluster may encourage innovation and productivity. The
finding of positive coefficient estimates on the number of hospitals and population
provides support for localization and urbanization economies, respectively, in the
hospital services industry. In particular, a positive coefficient estimate on the num-
ber of hospitals per capita can be interpreted as suggesting that it is possible to
deliver increased hospital services from a given amount of resources (nurses, physi-
cians, etc.) when more hospitals group within an area because of localization econo-
mies.
Both regression results provide evidence to support localization economies in the
hospital services industry given the statistically significant positive coefficient esti-
mates on the number of hospitals per capita. Also, because of the insignificant coeffi-
cient estimates on population, both regression results lend no support for urbaniza-
tion economies. The estimated coefficient on the number of hospitals per capita in
column 3 indicates that in 1999, hospital productivity was 1.6 percent higher in those
metropolitan areas with 10 percent more hospitals per capita than the average amount.
The regression findings associated with the other variables are also interesting
and worth discussing. The conceptual model anticipates a direct relation between
each of the labor inputs and average product per bed. For the most part, this expecta-
tion is met given that the coefficient estimates are positive on all of the labor inputs.
Moreover, most of the coefficients are also statistically significant and reasonably
consistent for both of the years. As an exception, the estimated coefficient on the623 AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES IN THE HOSPITAL INDUSTRY
number of admitting physicians changed considerably from 1993 to 1999 in terms of
both magnitude and statistical significance.
TABLE 1
Cross-sectional Regression Results
IndependentVariable 1993 Results 1999 Results
Constant term 5.71* 6.620*
(10.91) (10.79)




Staff per bed 0.021* 0.014*
(3.93) (2.15)
Other salaried personnel per bed 0.132* 0.128*
(2.97) (1.93)
Admitting physicians per bed 0.030  0.181*
(1.13) (4.89)
Nurses per bed 0.049** 0.047
(1.51) (0.78)
HMO penetration rate 0.022* 0.035*
(3.25) (2.72)
Trainees per bed -0.007* -0.025*
(1.82) (4.26)
Per capita Income -0.161* -0.250*
(3.35) (4.32)
Average Hospital Size 0.203* 0.280*
(8.69) (8.96)
Observations 303 312
Adjusted R2 .38 .39
Notes for the table:
1. Dependent variable is adjusted inpatient days per bed.
2. All variables expressed in logarithm form.
3. Coefficient estimates with t-statistics in parentheses shown opposite each independent variable.
4. Two asterisks imply statistical significance at the 10 percent level or better. One denotes the
5 percent level
5. Corrected for heteroskedasticity using White’s method.
It has been hypothesized that increased dominance of HMOs, as measured by the
statewide HMO penetration rate, directly impacts average productivity. The argu-
ment is that HMOs should put greater pressure on hospitals to practice cost-effective
medicine and the resulting increased efficiency should show up in higher average
productivity. According to the empirical findings for both of the years, the coefficient
estimates on the statewide HMO penetration rate are positive and statistically dif-
ferent from zero at the 5 percent level of significance or better. The relation is quan-
titatively small with a 10 percent increase in the statewide penetration rate only
improving average productivity by no more than .35 percent in the typical metropoli-
tan area.
Average hospital size is another factor hypothesized to influence productivity.
According to the results, average hospital size directly relates to average productiv-624 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ity, most likely reflecting scale economies in production. In particular, a 10 percent
increase in average hospital size is associated with an average productivity increase
of 2 to 2.8 percent. Lastly, per capita income and number of hospital trainees per bed,
as an indicator of the prevalence of teaching hospitals, are expected to exert an in-
verse impact on average productivity through its effect on quality. In agreement with
expectations, the estimated coefficients on per capita income and the number of train-
ees are negative and statistically significant for both years.
To further investigate the existence of agglomeration economies, the model is re-
estimated by first differencing the data over the two years. More specifically, the
difference between each of the various independent variables in log form is regressed
on the difference in the average product of a bed between 1993 and 1999. Like the
cross-sectional results, the coefficient estimates on the first differenced independent
variables can be interpreted as elasticities. The first difference approach provides
several advantages over the cross-sectional method. First, the first difference ap-
proach neutralizes any fixed effects associated with the various metropolitan areas
such as systemic city, regional, or state variations in practice style. Second, first
differencing of the data also helps to negate any structural differences in case-mix
and the quality of medical care that may surface across metropolitan areas. Third,
the first difference method allows an empirical determination of dynamic agglomera-
tion economies reflecting how average productivity changes over time in response to
the clustering of hospitals. The cross-sectional study provides a static determination
of agglomeration economies or how the clustering of hospitals affects average pro-
ductivity at a point in time.
The multiple regression results associated with the first difference approach are
shown in column 2 of Table 2. Notice that the first difference model explains nearly
two-thirds of the change in average productivity over time. In general, the signs of
the coefficients on the various independent variables are consistent with the cross-
sectional findings. More importantly, the first difference results provide support for
dynamic localization economies in the hospital services industry given that the esti-
mated coefficient on hospitals per capita is positive and highly significant. According
to its coefficient estimate, a ten percent increase in the number of hospitals per capita
over time is associated with a 4.6 percent increase in average hospital productivity.
The first difference regression findings associated with the HMO penetration
rate are also worth highlighting. Recall that the cross-sectional results provide evi-
dence that greater penetration by HMOs may result in higher hospital productivity
at a point in time. However, the dynamic analysis provided by the first difference
method shows that greater HMO penetration has no relation with hospital produc-
tivity over time. Thus, the results may provide support for the claim by Schwartz and
Mendelson (1992) that the reported cost-savings of HMOs represent only a short-
term phenomenon because HMOs appear to be incapable of influencing the rate at
which new cost-enhancing medical technologies are introduced and adopted over time.
Schwartz and Mendelson argue that once all of the slack is eliminated in the health
care system, future attempts by HMOs to raise productivity and lower costs may be
impossible unless rationing of medical services takes place.625 AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES IN THE HOSPITAL INDUSTRY
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
As far as we know, this is the first study to examine whether agglomeration
economies hold in the more modern hospital services sector and to find evidence to
TABLE 2
First Difference Regression Results
Independent Variable




Staff per bed 0.003
(0.65)
Other salaried personnel per bed 0.205*
(5.62)
Admitting physicians per bed 0.311*
(8.10)
Nurses per bed 0.125*
(4.50)
HMO penetration rate 0.0003
(0.57)
Trainees per nurse -0.005**
(1.32)
Per capita Income -0.123*
(2.17)




Notes for the table:
1. Dependent variable is the difference in adjusted inpatient days per bed.
2. All variables are first differences in logs between 1993 and 1999.
3. Coefficient estimates with t-statistics in parentheses shown opposite each indpendent
variable.
4. Two asterisks imply statistical significance at the 10 percent level or better. One
denotes the 5 percent level.
5. Corrected for heteroskedasticity using White’s method.
support both static and dynamic localization economies. Localization economies re-
sult from the efficiency of labor market pooling, incentives to innovate, and from
shared input suppliers and knowledge as more hospitals cluster in an area. The ob-
served productivity improvements resulting from the clustering of hospitals provides
yet another justification for encouraging a larger number of hospitals in metropoli-
tan areas. The previous justification was that more hospitals in a market area re-
sults in lower prices and better health outcomes (Kessler and McClellan, 2000). It
follows that antitrust authorities may want to consider also the possibility of any lost
localization economies when evaluating the relative merits of a hospital merger. Of626 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
course, the analysis must also bear in mind the potential for any scale economies
resulting from the merger.
Given the evidence in favor of localization economies, some states may want to
seriously reassess the overall value of their certificate of need (CON) programs. CON
laws were initially designed to prevent the duplication of medical resources by re-
quiring that health care providers seek regulatory approval before purchasing ex-
pensive capital items such as medical facilities and equipment. However, some ana-
lysts point out that CON laws create entry barriers into the hospital services indus-
try. For example, Santerre and Pepper (2000) find empirically that CON laws pre-
vent the stock of small hospitals from being naturally replenished. It follows that
some localization economies may never be realized if CON laws prevent new hospi-
tals from entering markets especially those providing new ideas and medical tech-
nologies.
Another advantage of hospital clustering is that knowledge spillovers resulting
from the clustering of hospitals may yield better health outcomes. For example, the
increased adoption and dispersion of new medical technologies resulting from the
clustering of hospitals may lead to reductions in post surgical mortality without nec-
essarily changing the quantitative relationship between medical inputs and output.
Our measure of output, adjusted inpatient days, only takes on a quantity dimension;
thus better health outcomes are overlooked. When measures of health outcomes be-
come available on a metropolitan wide basis, researchers may want to revisit this
topic.
Nevertheless, this study offers valuable insights into agglomeration economies
as applied to the hospital services industry. To date, health care researchers have
generally overlooked agglomeration economies as another possible source of efficiency
in health care markets. At the very least, this paper serves as a vehicle to introduce
health services researchers to the concept of agglomeration economies and thereby
provides another wide-open avenue for research into various health care industries.
APPENDIX A.
LIST OF DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND DATA SOURCES
Standard Minimum Maximum Data
Variable Mean Deviation Value  Value Source
Average Product 322.78 48.15 205.85 509.01 AHA (1994)
 per Bed (1993)
Average Product 359.32 57.79 221.94 582.81 Health Forum
 per Bed (1999) (2001)
Hospitals 9.52 13.58 1 119 AHA (1994)
 (1993)
Hospitals 8.66 12.25 1 102 Health Forum
 (1999) (2001)
Population 649,508 1,079,771 56,626 9,118,939 County and City
 (1993) Extra1994
Population 680,161 1,122,137 56,954 9,329,989 County and City
 (1999) Extra2000627 AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES IN THE HOSPITAL INDUSTRY
Appendix A — Continued
LIST OF DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND DATA SOURCES
Standard Minimum Maximum Data
Variable Mean Deviation Value  Value Source
Staff per Bed 0.030 0.048 0 0.484 AHA (1994)
 (1993)
Staff per Bed 0.068 0.072 0 0.563 Health Forum
 (1999) (2001)
Trainees per 0.054 0.085 0 0.634 AHA (1994)
 Bed (1993)
Trainees per 0.070 0.011 0 0.850 Health Forum (2001)
 Bed (1999)
Other salaried per Bed 2.91 0.49 1.49 4.41 AHA (1994)
 (1993)
Other salaried per Bed 3.39 0.69 1.16 6.36 Health Forum (2001)
  (1999)
Admitting Physicians 0.65 0.19 0.19 2.73 AHA (1994), County
 per Bed (1993) and City Extra (1994)
Admitting Physicians 0.76 0.40 0.23 3.34 Health Forum (2001),
 per Bed (1998) County and City Extra
(2000)
Nurses per Bed 1.21 0.30 0.63 4.58 AHA (1994)
 (1993)
Nurses per Bed 1.38 0.29 0.66 3.04 Health Forum (2001)
 (1999)
HMO Penetration 15.69 9.63 0 38.6 HIAA (1994)
 (1993)
HMO Penetration 33.6 14.73 0 65.3 Managed Care
 (1999) Digest Seriesi
Population 649,508 1,079,771 56,626 9,118,939 County and City
 (1993) Extra1994
Per capita income 19,399 3,307 10,085 32,927 County and City
 (1993) Extra (1994)
Per capita income 25,357 4,697 12,759 45,199 County and City
 (1999) Databook (2000)
Average hospital 76,498 31,227 17,433 216,202 AHA (1994)
size (1993)




1. Researchers generally use population in the metropolitan area to capture urbanization economies.
2. Because HMOs may be drawn to metropolitan areas where hospitals demonstrate high productivity,
statewide HMO data are used to avoid any endogeneity bias. The number of HMOs in each state was
specified in an earlier model but proved to be highly correlated with the HMO penetration rate.
3. Before taking logs, a very small number was added to the independent variables that sometimes take
on zero values including the number of staff physicians and dentists, trainees, and the HMO penetra-
tion rate.
4. Another potential econometric problem pertains to the endogeneity of the number of hospitals. That is,
more hospitals may be drawn to metropolitan areas with higher productivity. Using the 1999 data set,628 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
the Hausman (1978) method was used to test for the endogeneity of the number of hospitals. Instru-
ments for the test included the growth of population and per capita income from 1993 to 1999. The
Hausman test failed to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity.
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